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The aim of this paper is to extend the prior auditing literature by examining audit engagement challenges arising during government tax compliance audits. The prior auditing literature has examined how audit engagement challenges have been resolved through auditor/auditee negotiations.

The empirical evidence for the paper was gathered during a participant observation study conducted by the primary researcher over a period of six years while working as an auditor for the Alcohol and Tobacco Tax and Trade Bureau (TTB) of the US Department of Treasury.

This paper discusses various challenges faced by government auditors and how these challenges were resolved. The path to resolution was not always clearly marked. Resolution depended a great deal on the individual auditor’s judgment, interpretation of the Code of Federal Regulations (CFRs), and the willingness of the auditee to change the methods and techniques they use in operating and reporting wine operations. Materiality was determined by compliance with the regulation criteria [CFRs and the US Code (USC)] – any non-compliance was considered to be material. Resolution of many of the challenges resulted in an increased payments of excise taxes or penalties by the auditee entities. In other cases, the audit agency allowed the auditees to agree to change or amend their practices to correct a violation or a lack of compliance with US federal government regulations. As such, while the difference in the role and status of the government tax compliance auditor as compared with the independent external auditor did not necessarily lead to a different set of audit procedures, the pattern of communications between the auditor and the auditee in a government tax compliance audit were quite different from an external audit of financial statements. The government tax compliance environment is often complex, but the auditor may draw on a number of sources of knowledge and communication: CFRs, USC, Generally Accepted Government Auditing Standards, national audit planning, national experts, winery management, local peers, local government supervision, legal counsel and other auditors.

The primary contribution of the paper lies in the fact that little or no prior research in auditing has been conducted using participant observation as a research methodology. The use of participant observation provides new perspectives on the resolution of audit engagement challenges and auditor/auditee communication and negotiation.

Investigates the negative effect on employee welfare caused by economic decisions taken by corporate managements which they attribute to the adoption of an accounting standard, focusing on the case of McDonnell Douglas Corporation, which ended health‐care benefits for non‐union employees as a result of adopting the Financial Accounting Standards Board′s Statement 106 (FASB 106). It is estimated that the adoption of FASB 106 caused $148 billion in charges to earnings to be recorded by companies in the Standard & Poor′s 500 Index. Despite the large negative effect on earnings, FASB 106 had little or no impact on the economic condition of the affected firms. Nevertheless, managements have taken economic actions that have negatively affected employee welfare, and these actions have been attributed to FASB 106. Some of the hardest hit are employees at older industrial companies with mature workforces hired during the 1950s and 1960s. Some companies ended retirement health plans abruptly, while others required workers and retirees to pay more towards insurance premiums, or prevented new hires from receiving retirement health coverage.

The purpose of this Special Issue of Qualitative Research in Accounting & Management is to focus on qualitative research in accounting from a North American perspective. The goal is to highlight the possibility of greater contributions to qualitative research in accounting from researchers based in North America and to highlight some significant contributions produced by authors in North American universities in the qualitative domain.

The paper is conceptual in nature.

This sample of North American qualitative research in accounting provides an example of some of the different types of qualitative work being done. In most respects the articles are similar to qualitative research being done in other parts of the world. Perhaps the key difference is that the research has been undertaken for the most part by senior researchers who have been able to take some risks with a research paradigm that may not be widely accepted at their universities or they may be fortunate to be located at universities which value such research.

The paper broadens the view of qualitative research to North America where it appears that qualitative research has been relatively undervalued in recent years.

Through a survey of 200 employees working in five of the thirty establishments analysed in previous research about the microeconomic effects of reducing the working time (Cahier 25), the consequences on employees of such a reduction can be assessed; and relevant attitudes and aspirations better known.

The purpose of this study is to examine the possibility of adverse consequences regarding the recently enacted Dodd–Frank Act (DFA) pay-equity disclosure requirement in the USA, which will likely lead to lower levels of perceived Chief Executive Officer (CEO) pay fairness by subordinates. Specifically, the study examines whether the pay-equity disclosure leads to increased earnings management when business-unit managers have friendship ties with the CEO.

An experiment is conducted wherein participants assume the role of a business-unit manager and are asked to provide an estimate for future warranty expense, which is used as a proxy for earnings management. The study manipulates friendship between the CEO and a business-unit manager and the saliency of CEO compensation pay-equity.

CEO friendship ties, which are associated with lower levels of social distance, result in less earning management in the absence of the DFA CEO pay-equity ratio disclosure. However, CEO friendship may result in negative repercussions in terms of higher earnings management in the post-DFA environment when managers are provided with the pay-equity disclosure.

Future research may expand this study by examining how the adverse consequences of the CEO compensation saliency disclosure can be mitigated.

Management, audit committees and internal auditors should consider the possibility of unintended consequences of the increased transparency of CEO pay-equity while designing management control systems.

This study highlights the importance of understanding how employees’ social relationships with leaders may influence their behavior.

Unlike prior research, which focuses on senior executives’ direct incentives to manipulate earnings and subsequently increase their compensation, this study provides evidence regarding the earnings management behavior of business-unit managers.